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Imagine, Wittgenstein once suggested, that I have two 
friends who share the “same name”, and imagine further 
that I were to write one of them a letter:  
ich schreibe einem von ihnen einen Brief; woran liegt es, 
dass ich ihn nicht dem anderen schreibe? Am Inhalt? 
Aber der könnte für beide passen. (Die Adressen habe 
ich noch nicht geschrieben.) [...] Wenn mich nun jemand 
fragt ‘An welchen der beiden schreibst du?’ und ich 
antworte ihm, schließe ich die Antwort aus der Vorge-
schichte? Gebe ich sie nicht beinah, wie ich sage ‘Ich 
habe Zahnschmerzen’? – Könnte ich im Zweifel darüber 
sein, welchem von beiden ich schreibe? Und wie sieht 
so ein Zweifelsfall aus? – Ja, wäre nicht auch der Fall 
einer Täuschung möglich: ich glaube dem Einen zu 
schreiben und schreibe dem Andern? Und wie sähe der 
Fall einer solchen Täuschung aus? (Wittgenstein 1967, 
§ 7) 
Wittgenstein’s many questions are not easy to answer, 
especially considering what he implicitly presupposes. The 
epistemological difficulties explicitly mentioned and for 
which he attempts an answer are much more profound 
than they appear.  
The difficulties start before we even try to answer the 
explicit question, “To which of your friends are you 
writing?” They start with his belief that he can, and indeed 
does, answer this question. This belief presupposes, 
moreover, that he believes he has – or better: knows what 
it means to have – “two friends” of “the same name” 
(“gleichen Namens”). This directly involves his belief that 
he knows that he is writing – or perhaps better: knows 
what it means to be writing – “one letter”. Let us briefly 
investigate this. 
Wittgenstein claims to have written one letter. It is 
important to understand that he claims to be able to have 
done this before addressing the envelope. It seems that a 
condition for these claims, indeed for the entire story 
Wittgenstein wants to tell here, lies in a further belief, 
namely, that the content of his letter could “fit” or make 
sense to “both” of his friends. 
What exactly this “fitting” fully implies will need, of 
course, more explanation than Wittgenstein, or I, can give 
here. Perhaps it means something along the lines of the 
way that advertisements or mass mailings could be said to 
“fit” different people. A letter about a washing machine or a 
lottery ticket might fit me as well as it fits you, assuming it 
“fits” anyone at all. The criteria for determining in which 
way Wittgenstein’s letter “fits” his friends can obviously be 
much different and much more complex than even the 
most clever marketing strategy. But they could also be 
very simple. When I write a letter to a friend describing the 
activities I undertook on the weekend, how do I know this 
“fits” many of my friends? What does it mean for any 
content, phrases, or descriptions to “fit” even one person 
(and, considering the variety of contexts in which we 
communicate: one particular person at one particular 
time)? Do the addressees have to be “interested” (and 
what exactly does that mean?) in what I have to say? Must 
they interpret the illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects 
of my letter in a particular way – does a mass mailing letter 
“fit” those people who actually buy a washing machine 
better than those who do not, do my friends have to be 
pleased with my letter for it to fit? I do not want to attempt 
an answer to this conundrum here, since it is a peripheral, 
albeit important, element of my main topic. 
In any case, let us now try to answer one of Wittgen-
stein’s questions. If the letter really could be said to “fit” to 
either of two people, then addressing the envelope itself 
must be conceived as the last step in the language game 
of what it means to write someone a letter. I would like to 
claim that “writing a letter” involves a different degree of 
attestation than “writing someone a letter”. A letter which is 
not written to anyone in particular can certainly still be 
called a letter (consider a message in a bottle, a plea for 
help, a poster, a wanted sign, etc.). But is that the same as 
writing a letter to a specific person – say, to a friend? 
Whichever way we will interpret whether and how a letter 
“fits” a person, addressing it concretizes the act; it is a way 
of saying: “I am speaking to you [Bertrand]”. As I hope to 
show, Wittgenstein might believe that he is writing a letter 
to someone (say, Bertrand Russell), but he can’t know to 
whom, because he has not yet actually written a letter to 
anyone without having first attested to this fact, either 
implicitly or explicitly. 
A letter without an address in not yet a letter to some-
one, even if Wittgenstein claims to have already started 
the letter with a greeting (such as “Dear Bertrand”). To 
understand why his alleged belief that he is writing to one 
or both of his friends is not valid without attestation, it is 
important to understand how proper names work. In one 
important, albeit counterintuitive sense, one has to say that 
nobody has two friends of the same name.  
Two people called “Ludwig” do not share the same 
name in at least this sense: Knowing what it means to 
successfully use the term “Ludwig” to refer to Ludwig is 
radically different than knowing what it means to use the 
term “horse” to refer to a horse. Being “called” Ludwig is 
much different than being (or being “called”) a horse. 
I know how to use “horse” to refer to a horse when I 
know that the sign “horse” can be used (in English) to refer 
to a horse (or: horses) and, most importantly, when I know 
what horses are. This latter bit of knowledge is based on 
criteria of descriptive-judgmental nature; it involves 
mastering (propositional) knowledge of the way the world 
is, the way things in the world are, and how we tend to 
differentiated and reify these various things under various 
conditions. It involves, in metaphysical language, the 
recognition of certain characteristics or qualia in certain 
entities as the condition to being able to recognize these 
entities as such; it involves knowing what characteristics 
belong to which entities as the basis for their being 
recognizable as such. This latter knowledge (e.g., what 
horses, donuts, daydreams, fairies, quarks, etc. are) is 
different from the knowledge I would like to dub an “axiom 
of reference”, namely: mastering how to correctly use the 
term “horse” (in English). Mastering this bit of knowledge 
by no means needs to be in an explicitly propositional 
form. I would like to refer to this type of knowledge as 
being able to speak about things by using “concepts” or 
appellatives. Knowing how to use words like “horse” 
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implies mastering the (non-propositional knowledge) 
“axiom of reference” for appellatives, or A1.  
This axiom of reference is different for propria: A2: I 
know how to use “Ludwig” to refer to Ludwig when I know 
that the sign “Ludwig” can be used (in English) to refer to 
Ludwig; but, most importantly, I must also be familiar with 
Ludwig, I must know who he is, and this means, quite 
simply, that I know that a certain reifiable entity has been 
dubbed “Ludwig”. I cannot know what “a Ludwig” is or what 
“Ludwigs” are, since they will all share different character-
istics. The only characteristic which one Ludwig may share 
with another for certain is that they were both dubbed 
“Ludwig”.  
There is, in other words, no such thing as “a Ludwig”, 
since knowing what a Ludwig is would be identical to 
knowing that a specific entity has been dubbed “Ludwig” in 
an appropriate naming situation. The crux here is that this 
“knowledge” is not of any characteristics an entity may or 
may not possess; I identify Ludwigs not according to any 
characteristics the basis of which qualifies them as Ludwig, 
but because of my familiarity with name-giving and spatio-
temporal reification of those named entities. Upon entering 
a room, I cannot know which of the entities, if any, are 
called Ludwig – the paperweight on the desk, the lamp, or 
any one of the people in the room may or may not be 
called Ludwig. I might (correctly) assume that certain (very 
contingent) onomastic customs in many of our cultures 
cause exemplifications of the species homo sapiens 
sapiens of the male gender and with certain (difficult to 
generalize) ethnic ties to the German culture to be dubbed 
“Ludwig” more often than other entities. But unless I know 
whether they were named Ludwig, I cannot know who a 
particular entity is. I might guess as to who is named 
Ludwig, but I will more often than not be wrong, and 
likewise, upon hearing “Ludwig”, I will not know what that 
entity is (Allport 1979, Kaplow 2002). Mastering A2 is 
similar to mastering the axiom A1, but successfully using 
A2 involves the antecedent reification of entities (or better: 
events) without necessary recourse to particular charac-
teristics. I can know who something or someone is (I can 
know “Ludwig is 42 years old”) without knowing what 
Ludwig is at all. Knowing who takes recourse to familiarity 
(knowledge, if you will, of contingent socio-onomastic 
affairs), while knowing what involves descriptive-judg-
mental interpretation (Abel 1999). Using lingual signs 
proprially (as proper names) thus means knowing how I 
can use contingently homonymic or homographic signs to 
refer to a particular entity the reification of which may be 
completely independent of the criteria used in applying that 
sign to the entity.  
One can thus have two (or more) friends to whom one 
can successfully refer by using homonymic signs, each of 
which functions proprially. This means that the story told in 
my opening quotation is not a good, coherent, story. If 
Wittgenstein believed the story he told was good, he was, 
in at least this sense, fooling himself – that he really could 
have been writing a letter to one of his two friends of the 
same name. Writing “Dear Bertrand” at the top of his letter 
does not mean that Wittgenstein necessarily wrote the 
name of a particular friend; he has written a sign which 
does not yet function completely proprially; he does not yet 
know to whom he is writing. The categories of “content” 
and of “fitting” are relevant to knowing what characteristics 
the addressee (whoever he might be) might have, but 
these are not enough to know who he is.  
Wittgenstein, in writing the “name” of his friend(s), was 
using a homographic placeholder for a “real” proper name 
(a sign used truly proprially, for one individual). Knowing to  
whom he is writing entails writing the proper name, and 
this will entail a certain degree of attestation. By attesting – 
by making explicit the speech act: “I am hereby writing a 
letter to you, Bertrand”, and addressing this at one 
particular person named Bertrand – Wittgenstein must 
write the address and stand to his commitment that he is 
writing a letter, if that is in fact what he is doing, to one 
particular friend. 
This can be understood analogously to how a signature 
is used. I attest that the letter I have written is mine by 
explicitly consummating the speech act: “I, Ian Kaplow, 
have written this.” The name written at the bottom of a 
letter attests to the identity of the author; the form of 
attestation here also does not primarily involve knowledge 
(although it can, such as when someone wants to 
determine whether a letter has been forged and the 
attestation of the name is challenged). My signature 
attests to my identity. But what is this? I can never 
completely describe what I am (although many descrip-
tions will fit: an American, a brother, a husband, a 
philosopher, a short guy with brown hair and blue eyes, a 
person who usually likes beer but prefers Merlot with lamb, 
etc.); but knowledge of me in terms of descriptive 
judgments can never exhaust my identity. Knowing who I 
am – that is, having acquaintance with me – can be 
summed up perfectly in being acquainted with my name. 
My signature attests to my identity in much the same way 
as my name attests to me as reifiable object.  
The address on a letter is a form of counterpart to the 
author’s signature. It is a way of contextualizing the 
homonymic sign, such as “Bertrand” in “Dear Bertrand”, 
into a proprium. Two people named Bertrand will not have 
the same name because they have different signatures (no 
matter how “similar” these might appear graphically).  
Writing a letter contains a myriad of epistemological 
presuppositions, none of which are met in Wittgenstein’s 
brief thought experiment. Just as exclaiming “Two beers, 
please!” does not necessarily entail ordering two beers 
(such as when, for example, I shout this while driving my 
car alone down a deserted highway), writing a number of 
meaningful phrases and precluding these with a greeting 
(such as “Dear Bertrand”) does not necessarily entail 
writing someone (such as Bertrand) a letter. 
Thus, to answer Wittgenstein’s question, I would attest 
that before an addressee has been determined, before a 
name is used proprially and not just as a placeholder, 
before a counterpart-signature has been written, that 
Wittgenstein has not yet written a letter to someone and 
thus cannot have been “deceived” (“getäuscht”) one way 
or another. Knowing to whom he is writing cannot lie only 
in particular “intentions”, no matter how concrete or diffuse 
these might be (Wittgenstein 1984). Knowing to whom he 
is writing – or, contrarily, failing to know – will not primarily 
involve knowledge of characteristics, or knowing what 
criteria might make his contents “fit” certain people. 
Wittgenstein can be in “doubt”, but not primarily because of 
lack of knowledge – rather, because of lack of attestation.  
Understanding what it means to be certain (to have a 
lack of doubt) will not only entail differentiating between 
the different forms of knowledge I sketched here (knowl-
edge of who-familiarity, knowledge of what-characteristics, 
knowledge of the different axioms of reference), but of 
attestation as well: attestation to the addressed proprium 
and its counterpart, the signature.  
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